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Abstract 
This article examines how zoning – awarding exceptional status to selected sites – has been used as a 
governance tool to regulate access to land made available through land-use changes on the outskirts of 
Chengdu between 2007 and 2018. By studying these claims to exceptional status and the implementation of 
associated policies at the local level, the article seeks to demonstrate how zoning reconfigures power locally. 
The article argues that zoning delivers fast, socially controllable urbanization. The boundaries enforced 
through zoning offer less-privileged areas unique political and economic opportunities. Since zoning carries 
many advantages and is ultimately governed by the state, its implementation enforces state authority.  
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‘This street will be demolished. The government wants to build an old street’, explained an elderly man on 
the outskirts of Chengdu, one of China’s largest inland cities. At the time, nearby industrial zones featured 
stupa architecture and were named after faraway Tibetan minority areas, and a new park-like satellite city 
was expected to accommodate five million inhabitants. Being zoned as an exceptional site almost seemed to 
have become a norm – although, in a further twist of irony, a sad fate awaited villages not categorized as 
exceptional. As a party secretary in a village in Nanbu County, under the administration of the prefecture-
level city of Nanchong, some 300 kilometres away from Chengdu which had been bypassed as a site of 
exception lamented in 2017: ‘Here, we only have seven villages; the others almost all became part of the old 
revolutionary area programme, and Villages 13 and 19 were even recognized as poverty villages.’ All the 
other villages – bar the neglected seven – had more opportunities for public funding, because they were 
categorized as exceptional. Creating ‘sites of exception’ is a well-known feature in Chinese planning.1 This 
article suggests, however, that this sort of exceptionalism is now so widespread in China that it has become a 
norm that defines a new development in urbanization.  
According to Aihwa Ong, ‘The Metropolis … is still a site of exception surrounded by vast 
hinterlands.’2 This view of urbanization – as a process taking place in vast hinterlands that at some point may 
be subsumed under urban areas – arguably dominates urban studies in East Asia, where various forms of 
special zones are seen as sites of exception outside traditional forms of governance that still prevail for the 
vast majority.3 A prerequisite for capitalist expansion is the continuous accumulation of resources as well as 
the appropriation of value to resources in the capitalist system.4 In principle, thus, cities, like the urban logic 
they express, constantly expand. Often, in spaces thus encroached upon, this process leads to dispossession. 
In China, economic planning and political institutions have historically made a very clear distinction between 
city and countryside, allowing the transfer of abundant rural resources of land and labour to cities at a price 
below their value in the urban market. While the hukou (household registration) system assigns different 
types of citizenship to urban and rural subjects, the planning system allocates different forms of property 
rights to urban and rural land.5 Both systems have left cities with the upper hand where profit is concerned, 
and the post-reform introduction of various forms of special zones has accentuated a hierarchy of cities and 
regions which direct political and economic attention towards a few highly ranked metropolises.6 In China, 
cities are seen as exceptions, while rural areas and smaller towns continue to be the flagbearers of normalcy.  
Since more than half of China’s population is now urban, considering the urban an exception may 
appear counter-intuitive. This article shows that, at least in the south-western Chinese context, it is not only 
the metropolis that becomes a site of exception in the urbanization process. Here, a number of opportunities 
created by urbanization are politically divided between the metropolis and its hinterland. In this division, 
becoming an exceptional site of poverty, ethnicity, disaster, and so forth is important – and this in turn 
creates a situation in which nearly all areas become sites of exception. These sites hold very different 
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opportunities, some of which are much more attractive than others. The sites play in different leagues, so to 
speak, yet the mechanisms for distinguishing between sites appear very similar. These special opportunities 
contribute to maintaining and strengthening the zoning mechanism.  
This article focuses on the process of political assignment in the creation of different sets of privileges. 
In a global context, where often the economic integration of areas is understood as the result largely of the 
invisible hand of the market, this may seem an inappropriate choice.7 However, I choose this focus in 
recognition of the fact that the visible hand of the state plays a very significant role in Chinese urbanization.8 
In China, the many levels of the state monopolize the change of land status from rural (collectively owned, 
not formally commodified) to urban (state-owned and formally commodified through long-term lease-outs), 
and the local state in larger cities profits heavily from this.9 A very large share of the finances of bigger 
cities, especially in inland China where there is less industry, comes from changing the status of land.10 At 
the same time, the Ministry of Natural Resources enforces a system of protecting arable land by setting a 
minimum of arable land and limiting the amount of land that may be transformed to urban land.11 
Setting out from a brief review of the literature on zoning and rescaling in Chinese urban planning, the 
article first discusses how Charles Tilly’s theoretical work on boundaries may be applied to understand 
zoning on Chengdu’s frontier.12 After an introduction to the field and data selection, the article proceeds to 
analyse different zoning logics introduced by shifting policies, and the opportunities this rescaling has given 
to those counties included (or intended for inclusion) in new zones.  
 
Exceptions, rescaling, and opportunities for development 
 
Framing situations as exceptional is a common procedure in Chinese policymaking from the highest to the 
lowest level. Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li’s concept of rightful resistance is essentially about making 
claims that frame individual situations as exceptions to a prevailing norm of just governance.13 Similarly, 
Sebastian Heilman’s identification of policy experiments as an important way of introducing new policies 
draws on the idea of creating an exceptional space for introducing new forms of governance.14 In urban 
planning, exceptions also play a central role. This was the case in the establishment of exceptional neoliberal 
spaces when China introduced special economic zones (SEZs) featuring a market economy within an 
otherwise planned economy.15 In more recent examples, urban zones framed as part of the solution to larger 
policy issues, such as industrial innovation, urban–rural inequality, or environmental problems, have been 
important compromises between policy agendas featuring industrial growth and the protection of arable 
land.16  
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The establishment of a new zone is a form of rescaling. It redefines territories, and how they may be 
used. In cases outside China, rescaling is often seen as a process of ‘selective liberalization in response to the 
challenge of nation-state-centred developmentalism or the developmental state’.17 This view of rescaling is 
reproduced in Ong’s studies of spaces of neoliberal exception in China, and aptly fits the story of the 
development of SEZs in China during early economic reforms, even if the selection process was not a purely 
top–down exercise, since vast areas near the selected zones became dependent on the introduction of SEZs. 
Here, simply not regulating urban development led to considerable urban sprawl and gave opportunities for 
‘villages in the cities’ to emerge along with industrial clusters, creating a new organizational logic.18 While 
the establishment of the special zones was a strategic decision taken at the highest level of the Chinese party-
state, what happened in areas surrounding special zones was to a large extent the result of local cadres 
bending rules that allowed urban development to be accommodated by market forces.  
The SEZs were born out of an urgent need to catch up with the rest of the world and lift China out of 
poverty. Rescaling usually occurs when there is a sense of crisis or urgency: when, indeed, the situation is 
exceptional.19 In the early years of economic reform, local cadres in a position to bend rules and attract 
capital clearly expanded their own authority by successfully claiming a right to decide over new types of 
resources: labour, foreign capital, and land with the potential for urban and industrial development.20 The 
phenomenon of building authority by exercising a right over resources that are not clearly regulated is well 
studied by Christian Lund: contests over resources, he shows, are often as much over who has the authority 
to decide access as over the actual use-value of the resource.21 It is thus hardly surprising that rescaling is 
often the result of one or more state authorities attempting to gain influence.22 Claiming to be part of a space 
that constitutes an exception can be a way of both attracting politically assigned privileges and building up 
and maintaining authority to decide who should have access to which resources. Kean Fan Lim argues that, 
rather than a technique of liberalization, rescaling is an instrument often used in policy experimentation to 
build on new uses of already well-established institutions rooted in the authoritarian political system.23 
Rescaling does not always mean decentralization. According to Fulong Wu, the current establishment of 
urban clusters across prefectural and provincial boundaries expresses an attempt at re-centralization rather 
than liberalization. Lim argues that cities and sub-regions in these urban clusters acquire different roles. The 
logic of zoning thus extends not only to the metropolitan exceptions and their vicinity, but also to areas in the 
vast hinterlands that are allocated special roles in the new regions.24 Lim’s analysis, while not covering the 
entire nation, leaves considerably fewer areas untouched or unzoned than what earlier studies of urban 
regions in China contend. While in the past it was the relatively small SEZs that were made neoliberal 
exceptions as a result of top–down zoning, this approach to intervention now appears to cover much larger 
areas.  
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By studying sites located on the fringes of a metropolitan site of exception, this article concerns sites 
that are not top political priorities and are thus likely to be representative of many similar sites throughout 
Western and inland China. When studying the extent to which such areas may also use their exceptional 
status to obtain access to opportunities created by urban growth, Tilly’s work on boundaries and his concept 
of ‘opportunity hoarding’ are useful. According to Tilly, opportunity hoarding occurs when ‘members of a 
categorically bounded network retain access to a resource … that is valuable, renewable, subject to 
monopoly, supportive of network activities, and enhanced by the network’s modus operandi’.25 The most 
important boundaries are those across which exploitation takes place. Subcategories on the exploited side of 
the boundary may find themselves in a beneficial position to acquire advantages that they would not have if 
the boundary were not there. Both in the planned economy and during early market reforms, China’s urban–
rural frontier could be seen as such a boundary. While definitively exploitative, it nevertheless provided 
villages close to cities with special opportunities through access to land.26  
Following Tilly, the process that is subject to monopolization (the object around which opportunities 
are hoarded) in the context of rural urbanization in China is the formal change of land use from rural to 
urban. In a process of rapid urbanization, prefecture- and county-level governments may continue to carry 
out the same type of exercise for a very long time, and at locations further and further away. To them, their 
right to make land valuable by changing its status has become a modus operandi. Local authorities are able to 
manifest their authority by contributing to decisions about who gets access to which types of resources, and 
why. Though clearly not on the exploited side of the equation themselves, local governments represent 
territories defined as rural and in other ways underprivileged.  
In what follows, I study forms of rescaling likely to be exclusive to select areas (minority areas and 
disaster zones), or likely to spread into vast hinterlands (new urban and agricultural areas, and poverty areas). 
This selection of different forms of exclusiveness enables a comparison of a variety of potential ways of 
claiming authority through rescaling.  
 
Field, data, and materials 
 
This article focuses on two sites on the periphery of the new satellite city, Tianfu New Area: Yang’an 
Township in the county-level city of Qionglai, part of the prefecture-level city of Chengdu, but just outside 
the new area; and Shigao Township in Renshou County within the prefecture-level city of Meishan, part of 
which is just inside the new area (see Figure 1). Both Yang’an and Shigao townships are located closest to 
Chengdu City proper. In China’s current situation of very fast urban growth, rural areas that are becoming 
urban are home to a large segment of China’s population.  
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Until an administrative reform in 2016 added a new county-level city, Qionglai was the poorest 
county-level unit under the jurisdiction of Chengdu (16 million inhabitants, 14,312 km2).27 Qionglai is 
classified as an ‘old revolutionary area’, that is an area that contributed significantly during the liberation and 
is now ‘relatively backward’,28 which placed it in a favourable position to receive benefits from policies 
targeting backward rural areas. Yang’an, being the part of Qionglai closest to Chengdu City proper, was at 
the same time in a favourable location to attract business. In addition, Qionglai became part of a designated 
disaster zone because it was officially classified as having been harmed by the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 
and the Lushan earthquake in 2013. Figure 1 shows some of the different types of zones in Sichuan Province, 
while Table 1 lists the many different administrative levels.  
Renshou County is the poorest and most populous county in Meishan and slightly poorer than 
Qionglai.29 Shigao is one of two townships in Meishan (and the only part of Renshou) that is part of Tianfu 
New Area. Table 2 shows the fiscal situation of the county-level units including Tianfu District, and 
illustrates the vast differences in the opportunities for local governments to profit from land sales. 
Figure 1. Typology of selected zones in Sichuan and research sites. 
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Note: Graphics by Mette Willaing Zeuthen. 
 
Table 1. Administrative levels in China.  
Level  Population 
Country People’s Republic of China 1.4 billion 
Provincial level Sichuan Province 83 million 
Prefecture level Prefecture-level city (地级市)/Autonomous 
prefecture (自治州) 
1–16 million 
County level District (区)/County (县)/County-level city 
(县级市) 
0.1–1.3 million  
Township level Street committee (街道)/Township (镇/乡) 20,000–150,000 
Grass-roots level Community 社区/Village (村) 1,500–6,000 
 Note: Population at the provincial level and below are based on field sites visited in Sichuan.  
Table 2. Average GDP per capita (2016/2017) and average county-level unit income per capita from 
different sources (in RMB). 
 Tianfu Renshou Qionglai Jintang Nanbu Shiqu, Ganzi 
Years surveyed 2014-2018 2012, 2014, 
2016-2018 
2011-2013 
2015-2018 
2015-2018 2013, 
2015-2017 
2017 
GDP 46488 30089   36926   44896 30864 8338 
Income from local taxes, fees, etc. 4133 1623 2113 3817 662 574 
Transfers from levels above  2700 2860 2993 3577 3702 1673 
Income from selling right to land use 13343 4165 2512 571 465 0 
Land income as a share of income 61% 47% 25% 7% 9% 0% 
 Note: The darker the shade, the closer to Chengdu City proper. Incomes of a few county-level units are not listed in the 
table. 30 
I conducted fieldwork in Qionglai in 2007, 2015, and 2018; and in Shigao and neighbouring areas in 
2018. Additional brief visits were made to other selected areas in Sichuan in 2015 and 2017. The research 
permission that was issued to me restricted me to rather short visits at each site, and the number of interviews 
I was allowed to conduct at each site was limited. Conducting fieldwork in places where similar processes 
were going on allowed me to identify similarities and differences, but the frequent shifts between locations 
also set a limit to the depth of my research in each location. While villages in some cases might have 
influence on land use, it became clear that township authorities functioned as extensions of the county-level 
units when it came to land issues – because of which I did not study township governments as separate 
entities. In total, I conducted more than 200 semi-structured interviews with cadres from the prefecture-level 
city to the village level as well as with local elites and locals affected by ongoing urbanization processes. The 
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purpose of the interviews was to understand the informants’ context and validate my understanding of this 
context. Questionnaires were not permitted. 
 
Urban planning in Qionglai: From a model for urban–rural integration to a disaster zone, 2007–17 
 
This section studies how the urban–rural integration policy and relief policies after two large earthquakes 
allowed Qionglai to reconfigure which zones it belonged to and thereby maintain and further develop its 
opportunities to profit from land. In 2007, several years after the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao administration had 
acknowledged the issues of rural China as the country’s most important problem, Chengdu and Chongqing 
were selected as national-level experimental zones under the policy of urban–rural integration. By then, 
Qionglai was already an experimental site of urban–rural integration within Chengdu for several years. A 
guiding principle of Chengdu’s understanding of urban–rural integration was the ‘three concentrations’: the 
areas used for accommodation, industry, and agriculture, so that each type of concentration could be realized 
more effectively.31 In Qionglai’s case, this included demolishing villages so that peasants could move to less 
space-consuming settlements and thus contribute to the expansion of arable land. This allowed for the 
development of new urban land elsewhere through a quota system. Based on studies in Yang’an in 2007, 
Qiren Zhou, a liberally oriented economist, saw the ‘Chengdu model’ as a new invention since the reduction 
of residential space that was sold as a quota effectively commodified rural housing that formally could not be 
sold. Zhou, in his reports on Qionglai, presented this device as a way of liberating individual peasants.32 
However, the opportunity to sell housing depended on there being a large scheme in which the majority of 
villagers wanted to take part. These schemes would combine plots of arable land which could then be sold as 
quotas allowing development somewhere else. While this particular form of creating quotas by reducing 
village construction land (增减挂钩) was regarded as an innovation developed in Qionglai, most schemes 
simply added more arable land to existing wasteland (占补平衡) – which is a more strictly governed 
scheme.33  
As the poorest county-level unit in Chengdu, Qionglai was seen as an area in need of help at the 
beginning of the urban–rural integration policy. Considerable investments were made in the form of building 
new villages. This was presented as an element of the three concentrations policy. However, rather than a 
one-to-one relationship between new arable land in Qionglai and new urban development closer to the city, 
the justification for urban development was presented as a moral obligation to support Qionglai’s 
development. A recurring feature of the 2007 discourses was that local governments in collaboration with 
local business-oriented village elites should be equipped to contribute to economic growth.34 Exceptionally 
entrepreneurial village party secretaries were flagbearers in the most prominent model villages at the time. 
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One legendary village party secretary single-handedly organized the construction of a road linking a 
mountain village to the lowland; another set up an agricultural cooperative that was so comprehensive that 
the county-level government presented the entire village as a company. A third village party secretary had 
chosen to give up a career as a director of a furniture company and to return to her village. Through her 
connections in the industry, she helped establish local industry with employment opportunities for villagers. 
Newspapers also reported that she heroically had saved a child from drowning and driven the fortunate 
survivor to hospital in her modest car. These villages were heavily supported by Qionglai and used as 
propaganda. The village cadres’ initiatives contributed to Qionglai’s status as a successful zone within 
Chengdu, a national-level special zone of urban–rural integration, because they supposedly showed how 
village initiatives combined with government guidance could help eliminate the urban–rural boundary. 
As the focus on excessive land use around China’s largest cities increased, defending the Chengdu 
model became harder.35 The Wenchuan earthquake created an urgent need for rehousing and, even more 
importantly, it required Chengdu to finance reconstruction. One of the ways in which reconstruction was 
financed was by allowing disaster zones within Chengdu to continue to produce quotas by encroaching on 
rural construction land and developing new arable land. These quotas were then earmarked for the 
development of a project – either one within the county-level city of Qionglai (relatively easy), or one closer 
to the city (and thus subject to more strictly regulated quotas). This system was formalized in 2010.36 The 
prefecture-level city government set quotas for each county-level unit, which they could then assign to 
specific projects. Qionglai, though not hit very hard by the earthquakes, was classified as part of the disaster 
zone. A former official within the Qionglai’s bureau for land and resources explained how this was a de facto 
means of allocating additional funding to the county-level city. Between 2005 and 2017, close to one million 
peasants, out of a total rural population of six million in Chengdu, were resettled to make room for more 
arable land that could be converted into development quotas.37 While the change in justification allowed 
Qionglai to continue profiting from land, it had implications for the villages. When I revisited Qionglai in 
2015, eight years on, two of the three model villages fell far short of this designation. While the company run 
by one village party secretary had been closed as a result of suspicion of fraud, and the secretary’s son 
imprisoned, another party secretary still served as a model. She had upgraded her car to a Mercedes Benz 
and had her son placed in a company developing projects based on locally produced quotas. Her village was 
now so well equipped with playground and library facilities that guests took photos of them when visiting. 
Unlike the other villages, her village had been able to adjust. Though the party secretary was forced to 
demolish an industrial building that had, according to Qionglai’s authorities, been built not according to the 
plan – it was replaced by a well-resourced, Tibetan-looking recreational area – the village was prospering 
and producing bountiful grape harvests. Both the party secretary’s business and political career were 
developing. She was now a member of Chengdu’s party committee. Her village had succeeded because she 
had understood that it had to be part of the quota trade and disaster-relief policy by remaining rural, and not 
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become industrial as she had initially wanted. Authority became more centralized in the process, which also 
meant a change in the definition of categories ascribed to Qionglai: from non-exclusive (poor and agrarian) 
to more exclusive (when it was defined as a disaster zone). This change was paired with a general sharpened 
focus on land use from the central level.  
Wu sees the urban–rural integration policy as a means of addressing increased restrictions by the 
Ministry of Land and Resources (now Natural Resources) to limit the use of arable land because of the need 
to maintain urban growth.38 Here, the quota system fitted in very well by formally linking urban and rural 
development. While Chengdu’s transfers – from quite rural settings such as Qionglai to city districts – were 
presented as unique, similar transfers in fact took place as part of Chongqing’s land bill system.39 What both 
transfer systems had in common was that they were presented as unique. At least since Qionglai had become 
a model of the urban–rural integration policy, its status as a special zone was used to justify profiting from 
the land. This became the county-level city’s modus operandi.  
During fieldwork, a recurring argument was that the massive state-organized resettlement to facilitate 
urbanization and more effective agriculture was simply a way for the state to ensure economic development 
that would come about anyway, but in a more orderly way. Zhou argued that the quota system enabled what 
he saw as the liberalization of rural land despite an institutional backlash from government.40 Following his 
line of thought, zoning in Qionglai would thus appear as a technique of pulling the local state away from 
dealing with land. The shift from improving village lives to focusing more on accurately measuring quotas, 
compensating lost land, and trading quotas meant that village administrations became less influential. At the 
county level, however, the state did not seem to retreat. Qionglai became part of different zones (first as an 
experimental zone of urban–rural integration and later a disaster zone). While these zones introduced a form 
of rescaling that made Qionglai part of a bigger zone, the county-level government reinforced its authority, 
because it played a central role in trading quotas and defining the implications of the new zoning. The 
rescaling caused a centralization of power but also gave new opportunities, especially to the county level. 
 
The national new area: Urban order as a development goal 
 
By 2018, Qionglai was regarded as only a partial success. In 2016, quota transfers such as the ones that had 
taken place between Qionglai and the central districts of Chengdu were allowed within Sichuan (and since 
2017 even between provinces).41 Because of this, Qionglai lost its unique position as one of the few places 
that was allowed to sell development quotas to the central parts of Chengdu. Qionglai was no longer 
exceptional, and new development had to be framed in a new way. In the past Qionglai had been allowed to 
use its land in order to solve its own urgent rural problems (which within Chengdu were classified as 
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exceptional problems); then it was allowed to profit from using its land to help solve the urgent issue of 
reconstruction after the earthquake; and since its redesignation as a disaster zone Qionglai has attempted to 
profit from using its land towards the development of Chengdu’s ‘national new area’ of Tianfu.  
The first of China’s 19 national new areas were Pudong in Shanghai and Binhai in Tianjin, established 
in 1992 and 1994, respectively.42 Though Pudong and Binhai nominally hold a status similar to that of the 
other national new areas which were established 18 years later, Pudong and Binhai were functionally more 
like the SEZs set up at the beginning of China’s economic reforms. These two zones tested how the state 
could de-emphasize parts of state-owned industries while modernizing the remaining state-owned 
enterprises. The two zones were very clear-cut examples of neoliberal exception.43 The designation of Tianfu 
New Area (planned since 2010 but designated as a national project in 2014) became a national priority along 
with the development of other national new areas, such as Liangjiang in Chongqing (2010, the first since 
Binhai) and Xiong’an near Beijing (2017). Unlike Pudong and Binhai, these new areas were mostly planning 
areas, but not administrative territories, which rendered authority over them ambiguous and gave different 
parts of the zones opportunities to define themselves as part of policy initiatives emanating from various 
authorities with remits in overlapping zones (for an illustration of overlapping zones in Tianfu, see Figure 
2).44 During his visit to Tianfu in February 2018, Xi Jinping declared that Tianfu should ‘definitely be well 
planned and well constructed, with an outstanding park city look and a view to sustainability’.45 Successful 
planning addressing the demands for sustainability was, as in many other green zones across the country, a 
goal in itself.46 The new area was established after considerable pressure from the provincial government, 
which had felt bypassed when neighbouring Chongqing was assigned a national new area. The Chengdu 
government had fought less hard to obtain the national new area, since it was already busy developing 
another prosperous high-tech zone (Gaoxin (高新, translated as ‘high-tech’) District, see Figure 2). A part of 
Shuangliu County was separated from the rest of the county (now district), and its status changed to an entity 
with a name that reveals the authorities involved in rescaling: Sichuan Tianfu New Area Subsection Directly 
Governed by Chengdu (四川天府新区成都直管区). For selected statistical purposes, however, the district 
still appeared as part of Shuangliu. I choose to refer to the core district as Tianfu District. During the four 
years when plans for the establishment of Tianfu New Area as a national new area were known, but 
administrative changes had not yet been carried out, Shuangliu had, according to a trainee in the newly 
established Tianfu District, neglected to invest public money in the part of the county that was to be 
transferred to Tianfu District. According to the former intern, the logic behind the neglect was that 
Shuangliu’s government would not obtain any credit for the successful development of the territory that it 
was losing. Besides Tianfu District, parts of several county-level units within Chengdu, two townships in 
Meishan (including Shigao), and part of the county-level city of Jianyang (until 2016 it was part of Ziyang, a 
prefecture-level city) were included in Tianfu New Area (see Figure 2). Tianfu New Area at that time 
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covered 1578 km2, and in 2014 it had a population of around two million. The plan was to increase the 
population to five million by 2030. According to a head of department in the Tianfu District administration – 
appointed by the provincial government – it had been the plan to grant the Tianfu New Area Chengdu 
Section Committee overall planning authority over the Chengdu part of the new area (1,484 of the total 1,578 
km2, see Figure 2). However, in the end the district government was only given authority over Tianfu District 
(564 km2). To the governments of county-level units, Tianfu New Area was relevant mainly for statistical 
reporting and framing policy initiatives. Quotas for land for urban development were assigned through the 
various administrative levels to the individual county-level units. Tianfu District purchased 19 km2 in 
development quotas that had been produced by the reduction of village construction land outside of Chengdu 
for RMB 8.1 billion between 2016 and 2018.47 
Figure 2. Map showing the boundary of Tianfu New Area. 
 
Note: Map by Mette Willaing Zeuthen. 
When it was established, Tianfu District had a GDP per capita that was similar with the average level 
in Sichuan Province. Despite this relatively low GDP, about 100,000 newly educated university graduates 
had used the special opportunity available to them to obtain a hukou in the district. The massive investments 
from highly ranked state-owned enterprises directed towards Tianfu created the expectation that 
opportunities there would be rather more promising than in other places within the same radius from 
Chengdu. During the first half of 2017, the GDP rose almost 50 per cent.48 ‘Since everybody knows that the 
government wants Tianfu to grow, I know that Tianfu will be a success’, one of the graduates explained. The 
transition of Tianfu New Area from a rural area into a first-tier locality was a policy target that must not fail. 
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The establishment of the zone was a display of central authority, and county-level units governing parts of 
Tianfu New Area could expect to gain more opportunities by claiming to belong to the zone. Tianfu was not 
a neoliberal exception. Its purpose was not to experiment with ways of reducing state authority, quite the 
contrary. Nor had it been selected as a special zone because the area was backward or in any other 
exceptional situation. The justification for its selection was that it could be developed to display the best 
possible solution to the urgent task of creating, in the south-west of the country, a greener, and better-
planned China. By attracting investment and political attention, building a very large artificial lake, 
establishing a branch of the prestigious Peking University, building a number of metro lines, and even 
discussing the launch of a satellite referred to as a second moon, it was becoming clear that Tianfu was 
developing into a zone with distinctly favourable opportunities.  
 
Shigao: Picking the best from all worlds 
 
In the period under study, Shigao, in Meishan’s section of Tianfu New Area, was home to a booming real 
estate industry. Chengdu’s increasingly strict regulations on the number of flats that each household could 
buy meant that real estate prices in nearby Shigao were rising rapidly. This was because Shigao was part of 
Tianfu New Area, and located just outside the reach of Chengdu’s strict housing policy. Already, a university 
town with room for 20,000 students had been built, and a leading cadre in Renshou’s Department of 
Integrated Urban-Rural Planning expected that the rest of the township, with a population of 50,000 in 2014, 
would be demolished. This would make room mainly for more real estate in one half, while a national park 
in the other half was expected to attract considerable investment in tourism. Shigao was the home of 
Meishan Section of Tianfu New Area Administration Committee, directly under the governance of Meishan. 
According to Sichuan’s plan, the Meishan Section would consist of two townships within Meishan: one in 
Renshou and the second in another county (see Figure 2). Meishan, however, had added another 10 
townships under the coordination authority of the Meishan Section. At the same time as Meishan attempted 
to rescale its special zone, Renshou County made efforts to upgrade its status through Tianfu. It presented 
itself as the main authority for planning within Shigao and showcased the whole county as ‘a key county for 
Tianfu national-level new area’ and an ‘experimental county for the reform of small and medium-sized 
cities’.49 According to a planning department cadre, Renshou’s hope was that, through the county’s loose 
affiliation with Tianfu, it would be possible to transform the already extremely populous county into a 
prefecture-level city (see Figure 3). The county-level city of Jianyang, originally outside the boundary of 
Chengdu and like Renshou partially included in Tianfu New Area, was transferred to Chengdu in 2016 to 
conform with plans for Chengdu’s new Tianfu Airport in Jianyang. The airport was second in terms of 
investment only to Beijing’s new airport. This situation was exceptional, and according to debates on social 
Author’s manuscript ©Jesper Willaing Zeuthen 2020 zeuthen@dps.aau.dk  
14 
 
media and to the same planning department cadre, both Meishan and Renshou would avoid being subsumed 
under Chengdu, and retain control over the small sections of Tianfu New Area that formally provided them 
with a stake in Tianfu New Area. 
 
Figure 3. Renshou County’s 2011 vision of its relationship to Chengdu. 
 
Notes: Map courtesy of Renshou County. English text by author.  
 
The 2017–21 plan for Renshou County approved the addition of 6.7 km2 of urban land – of which 2.5 
km2 would be allocated to Shigao and 3.4 km2 to the county town.50 Between 2016 and 2018, Renshou 
County purchased 10 km2 of development quotas from outside of Meishan for RMB 4.2 billion.51 According 
to a leading cadre in the county’s Department of Land and Resources, these quotas were added to the 6.7 km2 
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that the county had been assigned. Purchasing such quotas required the approval of the provincial 
government, and trade was especially encouraged between poorer and richer counties. The Bureau of Land 
and Resources in Renshou regarded this approval as a formality. An official at Renshou’s Department of 
Land and Resources explained that personally he would have preferred that the county produce its own 
quotas for the benefit of local peasants, whose housing would then be improved in the process. Though 
Renshou had the lowest GDP per capita among the county-level units in Meishan, it was treated as a rich 
county because of the very large incomes it had been allocated – as a result of opportunities to sell land (see 
Table 2). The county now had to invest in quotas that would ultimately help another prefecture-level city that 
held several nationally designated poverty counties. 
The making of Tianfu New Area subjected local territories to a specific set of policy goals on land use, 
targets for population growth, and related issues. The success of high-level cadres allocated to the new area, 
as well as the standing of leaders in Chengdu and Sichuan, depended on the outcome of the prestigious 
project. At the same time, it was an opportunity for adjacent territories to gain access to political priority, 
funding opportunities, and rights to engage in new forms of development that this project was expected to 
bring. Many county-level units whose territory were only partially included in Tianfu New Area stood to 
benefit from being part of the new area; and at the same time they enjoyed the benefits of not being under the 
authority of Tianfu (see Figure 2). At the time of my fieldwork, since Tianfu did not have a hard border, 
areas far beyond the core district and the 1,578 km2 new area could benefit from Tianfu. However, which 
areas were allowed to benefit remained a policy decision, and local opportunities depended on the particular 
combination of zones to which different areas could claim to belong. While Tianfu’s 564 km2 core was quite 
exclusive, county-level units beyond the core could make claims to belong to Tianfu. Approval of the 
development plan could provide a platform for profitable investment in more or less random areas which 
carried a vast population in need of socio-economic development. 
 
Qionglai: Helping the rich and the poor prosper  
 
At the time of the fieldwork, the minimum investment required by the government before it issued 
permission to establish an industry in Tianfu New Area was considerable. In addition, more and more 
industries were no longer able to operate closer to the city, because of expensive real estate and increasing 
environmental demands. Industries thus began looking at Yang’an in Qionglai where regulations were less 
strict, and Qionglai’s government even framed Yang’an’s industrial zone in ways that would allow it to 
expand further. Both a factory owner and a civil servant working in the administration of the industrial area 
explained that different parts of the industrial zone had different names, probably with the aim of benefiting 
from different policies, but in reality there was little or no difference. The industrial zone consisted of two 
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main sections with a joint secretariat: Chengdu-Ganzi Industrial Park and Tianfu-Qionglai Industrial Park. 
Plans were in place to expand the industrial park (both the Chengdu-Ganzi and Tianfu-Qionglai sections) 
from its initial 14 km2 to 36 km2 in its first phase, and later up to 100 km2.52 
The names of both the Chengdu-Ganzi and Tianfu-Qionglai sections illustrate how the justification for 
each of them had emerged through the cooperation with partners that were not local. Tianfu-Qionglai 
Industrial Park was intended as a cooperation with the prestigious Tianfu New Area, while the Chengdu-
Ganzi Industrial Park was a result of Chengdu’s poverty relief programme for Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture. Yang’an’s industrial zone had changed its name to Tianfu-Qionglai Industrial Park because, 
according to leading cadres in both localities, it had been the hope of both Qionglai and Tianfu New Area to 
make this industrial zone part of the planning area of Tianfu. This implied joint leadership between Qionglai 
and Tianfu. For reasons that I was not able to identify, no permission was given for this merger. A local 
businessman closely connected to a number of local cadres explained that the cooperation largely meant that 
factories, which did not plan on investing enough or were too polluting to be allowed in Tianfu, might be 
welcome in Qionglai. Despite the fact that the industrial park was not formally integrated into Tianfu, cadres 
in Tianfu did not see any difference between the autonomy of Tianfu-Qionglai Industrial Park and the 
autonomy of industrial parks within Tianfu New Area situated outside the core district.  
Local officials presented Chengdu-Ganzi Industrial Park as an equivalent of an already existing 
industrial zone at a similar distance from Chengdu, but on the opposite side of the city. The zone in Jintang 
County (see Figure 2) to the east of the city was a joint zone between Chengdu and Aba Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture. According to a cadre in the provincial administration, the plan for the Jintang zone 
was conceived in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake. The eastern side of Chengdu had not been 
affected by the Wenchuan earthquake and thus was in no position to obtain any share of the many quotas 
generated by disaster areas. Wenchuan, the epicentre of the 2008 earthquake, was in Aba, but given Aba’s 
remote location, granting Aba the right to develop more of its own land would not generate much capital. 
Because of this, the two party secretaries from Aba and Jintang established the new industrial zone as a 
cooperative earthquake relief programme between Chengdu and Aba. Aba and Chengdu exercised joint 
leadership of the industrial zone and part of the taxes collected from the zone went to Aba. The Chengdu-
Ganzi construct was similar, but the reason for allowing the zone was framed as part of poverty relief, since 
the earthquake relief scheme was no longer a viable way of framing changed land use. The expansion of 
Yang’an industrial zone was an ambitious project, but in many ways it also simply extended a process that 
had been going on for several years in the context of increased land prices and unacceptable pollution. 
Industries were moved as close as possible to Chengdu that still accepted them. In this respect, the industrial 
zone was similar to urban expansion in any other market economy. In order to construct the zone, it was, 
however, insufficient to show that industries needed the space. It was also necessary to frame Qionglai in a 
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way that justified the expansion of the industrial zone; here, political reframing of categories and labels 
imported from the authoritarian political system were important. Just as Qionglai had previously lent its 
agricultural status to other areas by expanding its arable land and then selling the development quotas, 
Qionglai nowborrowed some attributes from other zones that would allow it to become more urban. It did so 
by using the poverty status designated to Ganzi and the urban prestige of Tianfu. Qionglai was thus able to 
reframe itself in a way that enabled it to continue profiting from changed land use. The involvement of 
parallel and higher levels of state was necessary in this process, both to protect Qionglai’s modus operandi 
and to enforce state authority. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Zoning makes it possible to direct different sets of opportunities to different areas. This is very useful for 
maintaining some degree of control over land use and, most importantly, to control the supply of urban land 
and prevent the devaluation of this important source of public finance. In local politics, as this article has 
shown, considerable efforts are made to claim specific opportunities that are linked to a zoned area. The 
opportunities for both privileged and less privileged areas within the zoning system have come about as a 
result of labelling localities as exceptional. The continued bargaining for opportunities motivates territories 
to push for exceptional status and thus makes zoning an even more useful tool for distributing public funds 
and special opportunities. Since the decision about zoning and its functions is always made by one level of 
government above the level of government concerned, this governance system ultimately strengthens 
(central) state authority. Although zoning strengthens top–down governance in China, it is not purely a top–
down exercise. We have seen this in the past when local bureaucrats and governments in the vicinity of SEZs 
adapted to the capitalist logic originating from the special zones. So under the present system, when zone 
boundaries are defined by shifting policy initiatives, there are opportunities for localities to adjust to the 
policy that any zone promotes. In this respect, the difference between positively defined zones – which are 
supposed to spread benefits beyond their boundaries to the abundant hinterlands, such as Tianfu – and 
negatively defined zones, such as disaster zones and backward minority areas, is surprisingly small. 
However, the opportunities arising from belonging to a positively defined zone are considerably more 
desirable. Yet the mechanism that allows urban development for an area such as Tianfu must contribute 
towards green development, and the mechanisms used to justify urban development as part of relief efforts 
after an earthquake are surprisingly similar. Both require political approval by the level above, and both have 
to actively consider how potentially dispossessed areas may benefit. It seems that techniques of policy 
experimentation and categorization rooted in the authoritarian political system are as important for 
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understanding China’s urban development as are more universal theories of urban expansion and zoning. 
Some of these authoritarian institutions even appear to have been revitalized. 
The extended zoning – dividing the country into different zones that are intended to fulfil different 
functions within an urban network – on the one hand appears to be an extreme way of accommodating 
market needs, and as Ong and Zhou suggest, ultimately subject the entire country to a planned, urban-centred 
logic. On the other hand, however, the government maintains control of how extensive the exploitation of 
underprivileged rural areas should be. The poorest and hardest to manage parts of the country become part of 
the urban logic because they are the ones that are permitted to benefit from policies that allow them to sell 
development quotas or in other ways obtain a share of the urban prosperity. All the boundaries – such as 
those between rich and poor areas, urban and rural areas, environmental protection zones and industrial 
zones – offer opportunities to the areas that are defined by these boundaries. This modus operandi for 
regulating access to opportunities contributes to the strengthening of both the boundaries and the authorities 
that apply these boundaries to regulate access to opportunities.  
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